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Hill: Jurors and the Sanctity of Their Verdicts

Jurors and the Sanctity of Their Verdicts
Undoubtedly the most common pictorial representation of Justice is that of a blind-folded woman in a toga (perhaps a goddess
from out of the catacombs of Greek mythology), weighing the scales
in determining the outcome of litigation. The goddess' blindfold
stands for impartiality in deciding the outcome, but it could also
be emblematic of the secrecy in which jury proceedings are conducted. In order to protect this secrecy, Lord Mansfield early set
for the precedent that jurors would not be allowed to impeach their
own verdict, even if their misconduct were such as would otherwise
warrant a reversal.' It is well recognized and accepted that Lord
Mansfield's voice from the past still speaks for a generally accredited
rule of law today.2 Some states have refused, by statute or case
law, to follow the unyielding view expressed by Lord Mansfield by
making a distinction between jurors testifying to matters within the
conscience of each juror (sometimes referred to as that which inheres in the verdict) and those matters which refer to extrinsic facts
or actions, open to the observation of all the jurors.'
In Mattox v. United States,4 a murder conviction was reversed
and a new trial granted when affidavits of jurors were introduced
to the effect that the bailiff had made damaging remarks with
reference to the defendant and similarly castigating newspaper
language was read by the jurors while they contemplated their verdict.
In the decision, the Supreme Court said that public policy forbids
the reception of a matter peculiarly within the conscience of one
juror to overthrow the verdict because, due to its personal nature,
other jurors could not testify thereto, yet overt matters within the
knowledge of all jurors could be questioned because all the jurors
would know the truth thereof. The Court went further to say that
evidence of jurors as to motives and influences which affected their
deliberation, ie., that which inheres in the verdict, was not admissible to either impeach or support the verdict. The jurors would be
allowed to testify as to the existence of extrinsic influences, but not
'Vaisev. Deleval, 1 T.R. 11, 99 Eng. Rep. 944 (1785). See Nordstrom,
New Trial-Use of Testimony of Jurors to Set Aside Verdict, 47 MiCH. L.
REv. 261 (1948), for a criticism of the theory upon which Vaie y. Deleval
was based.
2 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCB § 2354 n.2 (3rd ed. 1950); MCCoRMICK, EVIDENCE § 68 p. 148 (1954).
3 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2354 n. 1 (3rd ed. 1940). Text writers appear
to favor the more liberal view. See generally MCCORMNCK, op. cit. supra
note 2.
4146 U.S. 140 (1892).
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to the effect, if any, such influences would have on the individual
juror's mind.
The issue as to whether the Mattox case applied to the practice
known as reaching the verdict by the quotient method,5 since such
would be open to the observation of all jurors, was firmly settled
in the negative by McDonald v. Pless.6 Although the only question
that was present before the Court dealt with jurors impeaching a
quotient verdict, broad language was used indicating that generally
in balancing the interest between protecting the public interests from
post-verdict harassment of jurors and the pitfalls of piercing the
sanctity of the jury room on one hand, and redressing the injury
of the private, individual litigant on the other, the former should
prevail over the latter, except where extreme injustice would result.
It should be mentioned that neither the Mattox case nor the McDonald case attempted to lay down an inflexible rule not subject
to any exceptions.
The situation in the federal cases is further confused by Jorgensen v. York Ice Machine Corp.,' a case involving an agreement by
the jurors to abide by a majority verdict, which case permitted the
affidavits of the jurors to show their own misconduct; however, the
court also said that an agreement to abide by a majority verdict
was not a valid ground for granting a new trial, so this decision has
an indeterminable effect at this time.
There does seem to be a split of authority in the United States
when jurors testify to communications or other acts of third persons
with the members of the jury,8 but, except for rare instances such
as the Jorgensen case, even the liberal cases reject the testimony of
jurors when offered in regard to something that inheres in the
verdict. 9
5
The quotient verdict is arrived at by each juror agreeing in advance
that each will put down the amount he thinks is a proper verdict and then
dividing the aggregate by the number of jurors, with the result being the
amount of the verdict. See Miller v. Blue Ridge Transportation Co., 123
W. Va. 428, 15 S.E.2d 400 (1941).
6 238 U.S. 264 (1914).

7 160

F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied 332 U.S. 764 (1947). For

an excellent discussion of the federal cases in this area, see 6 Mooxm's
FEDmuL
PRACTICE, § 59.08[4] pp.3806-3814 (2d ed. 1953).
8
See Annot., 90 AJ..R. 249 (1934), supplemented in 146 A.L.R. 514
(1943).
9Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347 (1912); Mattox v. United States,

146 U.S. 140 (1892); O'Brien v. City of Seattle, 52 Wash.2d 543, 327 P.2d
433 (1958).
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The genesis of the West Virginia cases in this area is from
Bull v. Commonwealth,'" which held that, in accordance with the
weight of authority and the reasons behind that authority, jurors
should not be allowed to impeach their verdicts, especially on the
basis of their own misconduct. The court said that it did not intend
to lay down a set rule without any exceptions, but it did indicate
that it would look upon any such proffered testimony with great
misgivings.
The first apparent discussion of the problem in West Virginia
is in Vanmeter v. Kitzmiller." By dicta the decision in Bull v. Commonwealth was said to be conclusive on the impropriety of setting
aside a verdict and granting a new trial on the affidavits of jurors.
However, this was an instance involving the affidavits of a witness
who was approached and questioned by a juror, and such conduct
on behalf of the juror was clearly grounds for reversal.
Next in a chronological history of the subject in West Virginia
came Chesapeake & O.R.R. v. Patton,'2 an eminent domain proceeding wherein the court refused to allow jurors to testify that
they had rendered a quotient verdict.' 3 Although it is well recognized
in West Virginia that it is reversible error for jurors to consent in
advance to a particular method of arriving at the verdict, abide by
the result, and thereby surrender their right to dissent, it appears

10 14 Gratt. (55 Va.) 613 (1857). Since West Virginia and Virginia
have a common heritage from this case it is interesting to note recent developments in the latter state. In Dozier v. Morrisette, 198 Va. 37, 92 S.E.2d
366 (1956), W, an insurance agent, told the jurors, after the evidence had
been heard, that his company carried insurance on both the litigants. Only
W and the jurors had knowledge of the conversation, and in this instance,
where only W was guilty of misconduct, the Virginia court held this to be
an exception to the Bull case and allowed the jurors' affidavits to come in.
The Virginia rule apparently is in line with those states recognizing a distinction between acts of third parties and matters that inhere in the verdict, but
probably has a stricter test by allowing evidence of the former only in exceptional cases to prevent a failure of justice. See Phillips v. Campbell, 200
Va. 136, 104 S.E.2d 765 (1958).
115 W. Va. 380 (1872).
129W.Va. 648 (1876).
'3 For an unusual application of the quotient method see Bryan v.
Commonwealth, 131 Va. 709, 109 S.E. 477 (1921), where the court refused
to allow a juror to testify that in a murder trial the jury had used the quotient
method in determining the length of the defendant's prison sentence.
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equally well settled that jurors cannot testify that they used the
quotient method.14
In Probst v. Braeunlich,5 the West Virginia court said that it
was well settled in this state that as a general rule, with few if any
exceptions, jurors cannot impeach their own verdict. The decisions
in this state were said to be limited and restrictive in this regard.
Five years later (1889) the court refused to make an exception to the
general rule where two jurors tendered affidavits declaring that
juror F had stated to the jury upon retirement that he was well
acquainted with one of the parties and that the party had more
personal property than he (F) had and that F knew the amount of
assessment of that personal property. 6 Similarly the West Virginia
court has refused to make an exception to the general rule where
the affidavits of jurors were offered to show that depositions at
the trial were taken into the jury room,"7 or where the affidavits
were offered to the effect that certain jurors would never have consented to the verdict if other jurors had not informed them that the
defendant carried insurance. 8
14 Miller v. Blue Ridge Transportation Co., 123 W. Va. 428, 15 S.E.2d
400 (1941); Lowther v. Ohio Valley Oil & Gas Co., 88 W. Va. 650, 108
S.E. 276 (1921). See also Armentrout v. Virginian Ry. Co., 72 F. Supp.
997 (S.D. W. Va. 1948), rev'd on other grounds 166 F.2d 400 (4th Cir.
1948), for an erudite opinion by the late Judge Ben Moore, (which treated
this matter as a procedural problem, and therefore was not based on West
Virginia precedent), condemning the impropriety of jurors impeaching their
own quotient verdicts.
The question immediately comes to mind as to the manner of proving
that a verdict was reached by the quotient method, when jurors are forbidden
to testify to that effect. In Kelly v. Rainelle Coal Co., 135 W. Va. 594, 64
S.E.2d 606 (1951), an industrious counsel provided an unusual, if not practically applicable, method of discovering and proving such an improper verdict.
After the verdict had been read and before the court ruled on defendant's
motion to set aside the verdict, one of the defendant's attorneys inspected the
room in which the jury had deliberated. In support of the motion to set
aside the verdict, defendants showed that the jury room had been thoroughly
cleaned before the jury had retired in the instant case; that all papers in
said room had been removed; that no case involving monetary damages had
been conducted between the time of the cleaning and the deliberation in
the instant case; and after the deliberation fourteen pieces of paper had been
found, eleven with varying amounts and one with the amount obliterated.
The other two pieces found were apparently the two halfs of a single sheet
on which the eleven other amounts plus a twelfth (presumably the amount
on the obliterated sheet) had been added together, divided by twelve with
the result equal to the amount of the verdict returned in the case. In light
of facts so clear, the verdict was set aside. How often such an instance as
this would occur is problematical, but it may give some moral assistance
to embattled attorneys.
156 24 W. Va. 356 (1884).
Bartlett v. Patton, 33 W. Va. 71, 10 S.E. 21 (1889).
'7 Graham v. Citizens' Nat. Bank, 45 W. Va. 701, 32 S.E. 327 (1898).
'1 Graziani v. Fimple, 110 W. Va. 383, 158 S.E. 658 (1931).
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The logic behind the West Virginia decisions is apparent in
Pickens v. Coal River Boom and Timber Co.' Four jurors said in
affidavits filed with the motion for a new trial that the plaintiff
had treated the jurors to liquor at a saloon during the trial. The
court first emphatically condemned such reprehensible conduct, saying it was such misbehavior as would constitute contempt of court.
However, there were conflicting affidavits from other jurors controverting the alleged misbehavior, and the court felt that the preponderance was against the misbehavior. The court cited the Bull
case,20 acknowledging that while at first glance the rule is an unreasonable one, still it was felt that to allow such evidence would
be a strong inducement to a disappointed litigant to bribe or corrupt
a juror to impeach his own verdict. Public policy was believed to
be in favor of keeping the door shut against what was called the
certain dangers of frustration and corruption of public justice from
this source.
In a criminal case where the defendant was sentenced to hang
for murder, three jurors tried to say by affidavits that they acted
under a mistake of law, i.e., they did not know that they could
recommend mercy, and that if they had so known, they would have
called for life in prison. Three other jurors testified by way of
affidavits that all this had been fully explained. The court said
that this was an excellent illustration of the wisdom behind the
rule against jurors impeaching their own verdicts. The court would
not allow either set of affidavits to be introduced, but this case was
reversed by the Supreme Court of Appeals on other grounds.2 '
Since West Virginia has demonstrated a tendency to regard
with suspicion any attempts on the part of jurors to impeach their
own verdicts, it is not incongruous to find similar rules laid down
to the effect that third persons cannot impeach a verdict by putting
statements in their affidavits which reportedly have been told them by
22
jurors.
19 58 W. Va. 11, 50 S.E. 872 (1905).
State v. Cobbs, 40 W. Va. 718, 22 S.E. 310 (1895).
22 Utt v. Herold, 127 W. Va. 719, 34 S.E.2d 330 (1945); State v. Porter,
98 W. Va. 390, 127 S.E. 386 (1925). It should be noted however, that in
the former case the affiant was related to one of the parties in interest and
in the latter case the juror in question testified in open court to the effect
that he had not made the remarks attributed to him by the affiant. There
should be little doubt as to the West Virginia court's position in this situation, but it may not be technically closed by virtue of the fact situations in
these cases.
2Note 10, supra.
21
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It is well to note one case inharmonious with the aforementioned West Virginia authorities: State v. Dean.2" This is a case
apparently founded upon sociological, rather than legal, considerations. Here a young Negro woman was indicted and convicted of
murder. The jurors on voir dire were asked by the judge if they
were biased or prejudiced against members of the Negro race, to
which question they all answered "no". After the conviction, one
juror went to a beer hall where he told others (who swore thereto
by their affidavits) that he wanted to see the defendant hanged
because she was colored and that, furthermore, all Negroes should
be hanged. The court did not refer to Utt. v. Herold, or State v.
Porter,2 4 which would seem to be authority against third persons
testifying as to what was related to them by jurors, but in reversing
the conviction the court said that it was confining its decision to the
case at hand.
No discussion of this problem in West Virginia would be complete without a perusal of the cases involving jurors testifying in
order to substantiate their verdict. The earliest case found in this
area is State v. Cartright,25 which involved a separation of the jury.
The court held that generally the jurors should be allowed to testify
only where facts were brought to the court's attention regarding
the jury's conduct which prima facie vitiates the verdict. In such
a case the jurors may state any facts known to them which tend
to explain such conduct and remove the presumption of reversible
error. However, such testimony should not be permitted to show
what actually did or did not influence their verdict. The court
prefaced this holding by saying that it would seem that the reasons
for excluding the testimony of jurors to impeach their verdict would
be equally as strong when their evidence was offered to sustain the
verdict. The court felt that in criminal cases there was a great temptation to explain away irregularities, because if the jurors were to
admit misconduct, they could well be subject to public censure and
fines.
In State v. Robinson,26 the testifying jurors admitted that they
had received sealed letters after they had been impaneled, but they
did deny that any of the letters had any reference to the case.
23 134 W. Va. 257, 58 S.E.2d 860 (1950).
25 Note

22, supra.
20 W. Va. 32 (1882). Accord, State v. Cotts, 49 W. Va. 615, 39 S.E.
605 26
(1901).
20 W. Va. 713 (1882).
14
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The affidavits further stated that they had faithfully observed the
oath and had not conversed with anyone. The court held that the
testimony of jurors could be received to explain or disprove any
misconduct, separation or irregularity, but the jury could not show
by what motives they were actuated, or that any misconduct did not
have any influence or effect on their minds in reaching the verdict.
Also, in a case involving an erroneous instruction, the jurors
were not allowed to show how they understood the instruction;"7
and where a juror had to go to the lavatory, the juror could testify
that he neither met nor talked to anyone, but he could not testify
as to whether his leaving the jury room had any effect on the minds
of the other jurors. 8
It is apparent from the foregoing cases that West Virginia has
made a distinction between those things which inhere in the verdict
and other extrinsic matters connected with the verdict when jurors
testify in support of the verdict. This is the same distinction which
has gained much acceptance throughout the country when applied
to jurors impeaching their verdict. 9 West Virginia has not as yet
made this distinction in the latter situation, but it should be noted
that there has never been a clear factual situation before the court
in which such a distinction could be made." In those cases where
the controversial actions were by a third party, notably the Pickens"
and Cobbs" decisions, counter-affidavits off-set the impropriety
as clear a factual vehicle as, for instance,
charged and did not present
3
Mattox v. United States.
Upon reflection, it would seem that the most logical rule in
this area would be that expressed in the Mattox case. Where third
persons have introduced extraneous matters into the jurors' deliberations, the jurors should be allowed to testify to these facts. This
27

Reynolds v. Tompkins, 23 W. Va. 229 (1883).
State v. Harrison, 36 W. Va. 729, 15 S.E. 982 (1892). Accord, State
v. Barker, 92 W. Va. 583, 115 S.E. 421 (1922).
29 See generally notes 8 and 9, supra.
30 One case, Landau v. Farr, 104 W. Va. 445, 140 S.E. 141 (1927), does
28

contain blunt language to the effect that affidavits of jurors could not be
used to impeach their verdict; however, this decision did not even refer to
what was contained in the affidavits and should not be persuasive authority
today.
"1Note 19, supra.
32 Note 21, supra.
33 Note 4, supra.
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would not destroy the integrity of the jury system nor would it lead
to a wholesale influencing of jurors by bereaved litigants and their
attorneys. The actions in question would be apparent and within
the observation of most, if not all, of the jurors and this would
prevent injustice being done to an innocent litigant.
Lee O'Hanlon Hill
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